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UNITED STATES
1.

SUMMARY:

19

U.S.C ~(S~ . ~~hat

whenever a country bestows

di~o~ ~nt~ol':

~·t-t..,f.
k-~
manufactur ~ - ~ that c~ ~try

grant upon the export of any article

the United States shall levy an import duty equal to the net amout
of such bounty or grant in addition to any duties otherwise imposed
on that article.

*

The issues presented her e are (1) whether the

Copy attached

- 2 remission of a commodity tax on products exported constitute s the
bestowal of a bounty or grant for purposes of §1303 and {2) wheth e r
the Ct. of Customs and Patent Apps.

(CCPA) prop e rly ente r e d

sun~a r y

judgment for the govt, in this suit on the assumption that the
Sec. of th e Treasury made a detenltination that the forgiveness of
the tax do es not con f er a b e nefit
2.

counterva~lable

under §1303?

FACTS: vjapan' s Commodity Tax Law imposes a single-stage

consumption tax usually at the manufacturing leve l on certain
consumer goods, including electronic products like those manufactur e d
by Zenith.

The rates range from 5 to 40 per cent.

Upon exportation

of these products from Japan, the tax is either r e mitted, i f

·----

previously paid, or the products are e x empted from the ta x .
Zenith, a domestic manufacturer of consumer electronic produc ts ,
f

filed a petition with the Commissioner of Customs under §1303
seeking the assessme nt of countervailing du t ies on consume r
electronic products from Japan because Japan exempts thos e p r oduc ts
from its commodity tax when they are e x ported.

Six years late r

the Treasury Dept. d e t e rmine d that no bounty or grant was being
paid or bestowed, directly or indirectly within the meaning of
§1303.
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1516 (d)

(Supp. V. 1975) Zenith filed

suit in the Customs Court challenging the Sec. of the Treasury's
determination.
judgment.

The court granted Zenith's motion for summary

It. unanimously held,

in an opinion by Richardson J. ,

that the forgiveness of the Japanese

Co~~dity

tax- constitute s the

conferral of a bounty or grant under 1303, as a matter of law,
and ordered the Sec. of the Treasury to determine the net amounts
of the bounty or grant bestowed and to assess countervailing duties

-

equal to those amounts.

j

-

The court based its decision on Downs v.

United States, 187 U.S. 496

(1903) where ·the Court held that an

elaborate scheme of the Russian govt. was an indirect bounty
under the 1897 Tariff Act, the predecessor of §1303· Under the
Russian scheme, exporters of sugar were relieved of the ordinary
excise tax on sugar sold domestically.

They also received

marketable certificates of value upon exporting sugar.

The

certificates could be sold to other sugar producers who would then
be free to have their surplus sugar reclassified as free sugar
and sold on the domestic market without the tax burden that would
otherwise accompany the sale of surplus sugar.
In granting Zenith •s motion for summary judgment the Court
quoted the following portion of Downs.
The details of this elaborate procedure for the
production, sale, taxation, and exportation of
Russian sugar are of much less importance than the
two facts which appear clearly through this maze
of regulations, viz .:
that no sugar is permitted
to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise
tax of R. 1.75 per pood and that sugar exported
pays no tax at all .
. . When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced ,
but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by
whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under
whatever name, it is jisquised , it is a bounty upon
exportation.
Id. at 515.
The court rejected the govt. •s argument
was only dictum.

As an

indica~ion

~hat

the above language

of the precedential value of

the language, it noted that the Board of Generul

~ppraisers

soon

cited Downs for the proposition that tax remission upon exportation
constituted the conferral of a bounty under the 1897 Act and
that the Notes of Tariff Revision prepared by the assistant

c~

counsel to the Treasury Dept. for

~he

use of the House Committee

- 4 on Ways and Means in 1908 cited Downs for the same proposition.
It said that Congress' reenactment of the language of the 1897
act was a classical example of ratification of the judicial
construction put upon that language.

It rejected the govt. 's
the
argument chat _Downs had misinterpreted I
intent of Congress as
shown by Congressional debates for two reasons.

It said that

the statute's language was so plain that there was no need to
resort to congYessional debates and that even if the debates
were considered they would not have required a different result.
The court also rejected the govt. 's argument that the General
Agreement of Ta riffs and Trade

(GATT) and legislation other than

the Tariff Act required the conclusion that the remission of
the commodity tax not give rise to a countervailing tariff.

(
The court pointed out that international commitments such as
GATT cannot supersede acts of Congress and that the United States
entered the pertinent part of GATT to the fullest extent not
inconsistent with existing legislation.

Finally the court rejected

the govt. 's argument that the remission of the commodity tax
was not so excessive as to :require a count.ervailing tariff under
a long standing administrative interpretation of §1303.

It said

that the administrative interpretation was in conflict with Downs
and must yield.

Judges Newman and Boe joined in the opinion but

concurred to elaborate on the points made in the court's opinion.
The ca6'rt of of Customs and Patent Appeals

(CCPA) reversed

and remanded with directions to enter summary judgn1ent for the
govt.

It rejected the lower court's interpretation of Downs.

v

/---

-

:J

-

The CCPA held that the language in Downs stating that the remission ?
of an excise tax is a bounty was only dictum.

~

the holding in

~owns

It insisted that

was based on the conjunctive effect of the

remission of excise taxes and the further issuance of a marketable
certifiate on the export of sugar.
language of §1303.

The court then turned to the

In the court's view the words "bounty" and

"grant" were broad but not ambiguous.

-------...

It said that the "net

amount" of the bounty means the true boun ·ty or grant actually
conferred as an economic benefit.

Although the record was silent

regarding the economic result of the Japanese comnodity tax, the
court assumed that the Sec. had determined that the economic result
was not the conferring of a benefit that rose to the level of a
bounty or grant under §1303.
I

It asserted that nothing in the

language or legislative history of §1303 aided it in determining
whether the remission of an excise tax on exports required a
countervailing tariff.

It rejected the lower court's conclusion

that Congress has ratified the language of

Down~

the language of the act in subsequent statutes.

by maintaining
It noted the

Treasury Dept.'s longstanding interpretation of §1303

requiring

that there be a remission in excess of the excise tax due in order
to require a countervailing tariff.

And it gave the Treasury Dept.'s

interpretation great weight since the contradictory language in
(CCPA' s)
Downs was, in the/opinion, only dictum. Although it noted that
Congress has refused to follow suggestions that it enact the
Treasury's practice, the court found it difficult to believe that
Congress disapproved the Treasury's interpretation.

-

(

6 -·

CCPA
~ekaid

that the Treasury's

longstand~ng

interpretation

must stand as a permissible interpretation of §1303 until lawfully
changed and held that the Treasury had not erred in its conclusion
that the Japanese Commodity Tax is .a non-excessive remission of
an excise tax which fails to constitute a bounty or grant under
the statute.

It ordered· the lower court to enter

sun~ary

judgment

for the govt.
Judge Miller wrote a dissenting opinion which Judge
Baldwin joined.

He insisted

was not dictum but that th

the disputed language of Downs
had found that the Russian

scheme included two bou.ntie

of the excise tax

and the provision of valuable

-.7 He

r:r-,.,.............

said that the

finding of either bounty supported the result in that case and

I
that both findings were of equal validity.

As further support

for his interpretation of Downs he noted that the disputed
portion of Downs had been recognized as an example of an indirect
bounty in Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 41 (191 9 )
Judge Miller rejected the Treasury's longstanding interpretation
of §1303 as inconsistent with judicial interpretation.

He also

examined the legislative history of the Tariff Act's revisions
since Downs and concluded that "Congress has ·not acquiesced in
the administrative practice of failing to recognize the ordinary
remission of e xcise taxes as a bounty or grant for purposes of
section [1303] much less repudiated, or given any signal of its
disfavor with, the interpretation of the key language in section

(

,,

[1303] by the Supreme Court.

- 7 (

3.

CONTENTIONS;

(1) Zenith argues that the disputed portion

of Downs was not dictum and that the decision below is in conflict
with Downs.

As support for its position it repeats the argument

of the dissent and the Court of Customs.

It notes that Congress

responded to complaints about thv Treasury's refusal to levy the
requested countervailing tariff by providing for the first time
in 1975 that American manufacturers can obtain judicial review
of decisions not to impose countervailing tariffs.

[This case

is the first case brought to the CCPA under that right of judicial
review].
In response the SG says that Downs did not decide whether
a non-excessive remission of a tax, standing alone, constitutes
a bounty or grant under the statute and argues that the legislative
history of the Tariff Act both before and after Downs as well as
Congress' acquiescence in the Treasury's longstanding interpretation
of the statute supports the holding below.

He contends that the

countervailing duty assessed in Downs did not in fact include the
amount of the excise tax remission but was based upon the value
of the marketable certificates.

In response to that contention

Zenith notes that the amount of the countervailing duty assessed
in Downs was clearly not in issue.
The SG also points out that existing trade agreements,
including GATT, to which the U.S. is a party1 adopt ·the principle
that countervailing duties shall not be assessed in response to
the remission of excise taxes on exports.

He warns that adoption

of Zenith's construction of §1303 would undermine the flexibility
of the United States' position in upcoming negotiations under the

-

~

-

GATT, risk a significant breakdown in international trading
agreements, and invite retaliatory actions.

He insists that

as long as ther e is a possibility that the CCPA may be revers e d,
there will be considerable uncertainty in the United States'
position and negotiating options.
United States Ste e l and Bethlehem Steel have filed amicus
briefs in support of Zenith.
\

They make the same basic arguments

and also urge the Ct. of Cust. and Patent Apps's decision to d efer
to the Treasury Dept. has subverted the Congressiona l intent to
provide meaningful judicial review of the Treasury's determination
to domestic manufacturers.

U.S. Steel is currently litigating

the same issue regarding the remission

of

the value added

tax on exported steel by six European countries.

The Committe e

to Preserve American Color Television (CAMP) has also filed an
amicus bri e f in support of Zenith.

It emphasizes th e import a n ce

of this case to the dome stic consumer electronics i ndust ry .
(2)

Zenith says that the CCPA should have rema nd e d the

case for furth e r evidence since it suggested that the economic
result of the tax remission was important and did not decide that
remission of an excise tax is not a bounty as a matter of law.
This argument se e ms to be based on the CCPA's statement that
it is the eco11omic result of the foreign govt.'s action which
on the CCPA 's
controls and kssumptio11 that the Sec. had determined tha t the
economic result here is not the conferring of such a benefit
as would rise to the level of a bounty or grant.
The SG replies that there was no need to remand because

(.

there was no factual dispute about the economic result of the
remission .

The only issue, according to the SG, was whether as

-

:::1

-

a matter of law, the remission of taxes upon export is a grant
or bounty giving rise to an obligation tro impose a countervailing
duty.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There is nothing certworthy anout the

second issue.

The CCPA's opinion is not entirely clear but,
CCPA
contrary to what Zenith says,the/seems 'to have accepted the
Treasury's interpretation as a permissible one as a matter of
law.

Since the Treasury has decided that the remission of an

excise tax on exports alone does not require a countervailing
tariff, there seems no need for further fact finding.
The first issue probably requires the Court's attention.
Congress has apparently acquiesced in both the language of Downs
and the Treasury's policy of not imposing a countervailing tariff
against the remission of an excise tax.

The legislative history,

as far as it is contained in the briefs, seems inconclusive.

The

real question is whether the crucial language in Downs is dictum
and, if not, whether it should be overruled.

Although it is

possible to interprete Downs as holding only that the issuance
of a valuable certificate upon the export of sugar in addition
to remission of excise taxes is a bounty, the more accurate
interpretation seems to be that of the Customs Court.

Despite

the SG's argument that granting cert would create uncertainty
in the govt. 's trade negotiations, Congress has clearly placed
the issue in the courts by providing judicial review for Zenith's
complaint and refusing to settle the issue by amending the statute.
Congress is free to amend the statute if it dislikes the
uncertainty arising from judicial review.
There
Grant
1/3/78
BE

Pa.rr

opns in petn.

It is very difficult to read the statements in the Downs
case upon which • Zenith relies as dicta, as the court below
tried to do. The
Downs Court made the same point over and
over:
"A bounty may be direct, as where a certain amount is
paid upon the production or exportation of particular
articles ••• or indirect, by the remission of taxes upon
the exportation of articles which are s~ected to a tax
when sold or consumed in the country of their production,
of which our laws, permitting distillers of spirits to
export the same without payment of an internal revenue
tax or other burden, is an example." 187 U.S., at 502.
"[I]£ a preference be given to merchandise exported over
that sold in the home market, by the remission of an excise
tax, the effect would be the same as if all such merchandise
were taxed, and a drawback repaid to the manufacturer upon so
much as he exported • • • o [WJhere ••o these regulations exempt
sugar exported from excise taxation altogether, we think it
clearly falls within the definition of an indirect bounty
upon exportation." Id., at 513.
"When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted
upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in
whatever manner, or under whatever name it is disguised, it
is a bounty upon exportation." Id., at 515 •
• ~/
V

In short, I think it is very likel
tat the court below misread
Downso It may be that the case s ou d e overru e , ut
o not
think the Court should allow a lower court to make that decision.
%kexEaxe This case appears to be of eneral imno~~ce, given the
amicus support for a grant. I woul vote o grant.
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Chap.
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11.
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10.

..
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·CHAPTER 4.-TARIFF ACT OF 1930
SUBTITJ.,E !I.--SPECIAL PROVISIONS
PART IlL-PROMOTION OF FO\lEIGN TRADE

Sec.
1356j.

Sec.
1356a.

Importation of coffee under · Int e rnational Coffee Agreement.
19<l2; l'rcr.id en tlnl powers nnd
duties [N<>w).
l356b. Dc!Jnltlon of coffee [New).
1356c. Delegation o! l'rrsldentinl l'owera
and duties; protection o interests or Uuitr<l States consumers
[New).
1356d. Report to t11o Congress (New).
1356e. Authorization or "Jlproprlatlons;
llmitntlon on United Stntea contrlbulloo for administration o!

:ket Part by Title Number

l'hus ·

U.S.C.A. §

\_.

unl\!fect~d.

SUBTITLE

\ ,

•J

"'.: 'I

J

'

' ·.
1 '

-.
• ..-:''

• -

·.

•

. i

1466.

1356!. ·Importation of coffee und er lntrrnntionnl Coffee Agreewent, 1968;
Prcsidenllnl }Jowers und duties
[New).
1358g. Definition o! coffee [New].
135611. Deler:utio n of Pre~identinl powers
and duties; J>rot"Ctlon o! interests of lJnJte States consumers;
remedial action [New).
13561. Report to the Coagress [New].'

1·:'

~ I

,_

IIT.-AD~riNISTRATIVE

!'lWVlSIO;\'S

PAHT li .-REPOI:T, ENTHY, AN'O UNLADING
OF VES SELS Ah'D \"EIIICLI:S

agreemen t [New).

·. i

Pre,·cntion
of
•liHr rirninntlou
ll!'lilnst ves.<,'IR r~gi,lcrPd llll!lcr
laws of ll1e t :nlled !:>lnlPs [l\cw].
(n) l'rocedur<>; rcm Pd inl fl <·tion.
(b) PulJ!Ieotlon in Federal Heglsler o! finding-~.
(c) Powers nnd dull(·" of FNleral Marillmc Commission

Equipment nnd repairs of ''eHse ls
(N ew).
(a) V('s•rls suhject to duly;

penalties.
(b) Remission for necessary repni•·s.
(c) Ye s~els used primarily for
purpo"es other thnn transporting pn ssengrrs or properly Jn tl1e foreign or coasting trade.

SUBTITLE H.-SPECIAL PROVISIONS
PART 1.-MlSCEI,LANEOUS

...

.·

:.,....
; !o

•

'

§ 1303. Count.ervn.iling dnties-JAwy of count<>n:>..lUr..g unties
(a) (1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other
political· subdivision of government, person, partnership, nssociation,
cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow, dlrec1ly or lndlreetly, any
bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any
article. or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, drpendeney, colony, province, or othrr political subdivi si on of goyermnent ,
then upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United
States, whether the same shall be imported directly from tho country of
production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise Is imported in the same condition as when exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by remanufacture or otherwise,
there shall be levied and paid, In all such cases, in addition to any duties
Otlterwise imposed, a duty equal to tho net amount of such bounty or
grant, however the same be paid or bestowed ..

...
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,_ ..

t
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(2) In the case of r,ny Imported article or merchandise which In free

.· ···

or dutr, duties may Lo Imposed under this section ?Uly if there is an
1.9 U.S.C .A.
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BENCH MEMO
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States

Under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the
Trade Act of 1974, 19

- --._.

u.s.c.

-

§

1303, the Secretary of the

-

Treasury must offset any foreign subsidization of exports
with an import duty

,_,

eg~l

to the net amount of the

~-

subsidy.

._..

19 U.S.C.

§

1303.

aws

The investigation leading to

such a determination may be initiated either by the
government or by a private party.

Ibid.

The

responsibility to impose a countervailing duty is limited
only by exceptions defined in the statute.

For example,

if the imported good is duty free, a countervailing duty
may be imposed only upon a showing of domestic injury.

2.

The issue presented here is whether, under the
Act, the Japanese Commodity Tax Law bestows ~ ':Eount_y@

2.5an~" within the terms of the Trade Act, 19 u.s.c.
1303.

3-+'-~•~

§

J -~ ~

The Japanese law imposes an internal tax upon

products~~~

manufacturer's shipments of certain electronic

destined for consumption in Japan, with rates varying
5 to 20 percent.

When such goods are destined for

however, the tax is

~a ted

o::._

~o:_ coll,;.cted.

~I'M-

fro~

1 --~~~
...&U4r~

export,~

Zenith

1:'~

alleged that such remissions amount to a "grant or bounty" ~
on exports and requested the imposition of a
countervailing duty to offset it.
In January 1976, the Acting Commissioner of
Customs, after a six-year delay, announced that remission
of the Japanese Commodity Tax was not a "bounty or grant"
and refused to impose a countervailing duty.
§

Pursuant to

32l(f) (1) of the Act, Zenith contested this

determination in the Customs Court.

That court

unanimously held that remission of the Commodity Tax was
bounty or grant as a matter of law and granted summary
judgment for Zenith.

430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).

The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, 3-2.
562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
The case revolves around two principal issues:
(i) the proper interpretation of an old case dealing with

3.

the "bounty or grant" language in a predecessor statute,
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); and (ii)
whether as a matter of "economic reality" the mere
remission of an indirect tax can amount to a subsidy.

resolve both in Zenith's favor and reverse.

As a matter

of-------------~---------------------~-----d
foreign policy, the C.C.P.A. result might be desirable,
but under the statute and the Downs case, it is difficult,
to reach.

I

THE MEANING OF DOWNS
Zenith insists that mere remission of an indirect
tax is a "bounty or grant" within the meaning of the
statute.

The Treasury takes the position -- and

apparently has done so for 80 years -- that noncollection
of an indirect tax is fundamentally neutral;

a bounty or

grant is made only if the remission is "excessive," that
is, if an amount is remitted over and above the amount of
the tax.

The primary battleground in this dispute is

Downs v. United States, 187

u.s.

496 (1903), which

involved an elaborate Russian program for controlling
sugar production and prices.
The Russian government placed all sugar into

4.

three categories:

(i) "free sugar," which could be sold

domestically subject to a standard 1.75 ruble excise tax;
(ii) "indivertible reserve," which had to be held by the
manufacturer in case greater quantities were needed to
prevent domestic prices from exceeding a predetermined
ceiling;

and (iii) "free surplus," which was all sugar

left after specifying the amounts in the first two
categories.

Free surplus could not be sold domestically

except upon the payment of a prohibitive double excise of
3.50 rubles.

If free surplus was exported, however, the

producer received both a remission of the normal excise
tax and a certificate he could negotiate to other
producers allowing the transfer from the free surplus
category (which could be sold domestically only at the
prohibitive double excise) to the free sugar category
(which could be sold domestically at the standard excise)
of an amount of sugar equal to the amount exported.

The

Court described the results of this arrangement:
"
By this arrangement neither the total amount
of free sugar allowed to the two manufacturers
nor the total export has been increased, since
what the assignor [of the certificate] exports
the assignee sells as free sugar. The assignee,
however, has secured the large profits of the
sale of his sugar at horne and saved his freight
to the coast, while on the other hand the seaport
merchant has sacrificed those profits by
exporting sugar at a less remunerative price. It
follows that the price received for his export

fJ~ -~ ~

~

5•

certificate is the difference between what he
would have received had he sold his free sugar at
home and the price he would have obtained on the
foreign market." 187 U.S., at 512.
Although the Court did not discuss the actual
prices obtained for the certificates, a Treasury document
submitted to the Court explained that the minimum price
was 1 ruble.

App. 49-51.

By some undisclosed process of

reasoning, this fact led the Secretary to impose a
countervailing duty of .50 ruble, on the theory that a
minimum price of 1 ruble permitted export of sugar at a
price .50 ruble below cost of production but the earning
of .50 ruble profit.
"countervailed":

This value alone was

although the Court does not mention it,

the remitted 1.75 excise tax was not included in the
countervailing duty.
The Court upheld the Secretary's imposition of
the countervailing duty, holding that the Russian scheme
amounted to a "bounty or grant" under the statute.

The

customs Court seized repeated phrases in the Downs
opinion, such as the following, and concluded that mere
remission of a tax is a bounty or grant:
"The details of this elaborate procedure for the
production, sale, taxation, and exportation of
Russian sugar are much less important than the
two facts which appear clearly through this maze
of regulations, viz.: that no sugar is permitted

6.

to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise
tax of R. 1.75 per pood [about 36 pounds], and
that sugar exported pays no excise tax at all.
The mere imposition of an import duty of three
roubles per pood, paid upon foreign sugar, is,
like all protective duties, a bounty, but a
bounty on production, and not upon exportation.
When a tax is imposed on all sugar produced, but
is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by_
whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under
whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty
upon exportation." Id., at 515 (emphasis added}.
C.C.P.A. dismissed this language and similar
statements in the Downs opinion as dicta.

Judge Markey

argued that in other portions of the decision, the Court
refers to the certificate procedure and the scheme as a
whole, rather than to the remission of the tax, as the
bounty.

Moreover, the actual countervailing duty that the

Court upheld did not embrace the value of the excise tax
remitted upon export, but was limited to the net value of
the certificate.

Thus, said C.C.P.A., the actual holding

of Downs was limited to an excessive remission of an
excise tax -- the bounty was the boost that the
cerfificates gave the exporter over and above the
remission of the standard excise.

Petn 63a, 65a.

In

Judge Markey's view, Downs' holding mandates the
Treasury's position that remission of an indirect tax is a
bounty or grant only when it is excessive.

This is also

the view of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61

7.

Stat. A63, to which the United States is a party, and
which C.C.P.A. seemed quite anxious to prevent the U.S.
from violating.
As an exercise in the reading of cases, Judge
Markey's opinion is not completely persuasive.

In

describing as a bounty the "remission of taxes upon the
exportation of articles which are subjected to a tax when
sold or consumed in the country of their production," 187
U.S., at 502, the Downs Court cited United States v.
Passavant, 169

u.s.

16 (1898).

In that case, the German

government imposed a duty upon merchandise sold in the
domestic market, which was collected when the finished
product went into the consumer market.

Since the tax was

collected upon sale, the price reflected the tax.

Upon

exportation of the product, however, the tax was not
imposed or its payment rebated.

The Court nevertheless

held that the amount of the tax was to be considered in
determining the dutiable value of German goods imported
into the United States:
"[The remission of the tax] is a special
advantage extended by the government in aid of
manufacturers and trade, having the same effect
as a bonus or drawback. To use one of the
definitions of drawback, it is 'a device resorted
to for enabling a commodity affected by taxes to
be exported and sold in the foreign market on the
same terms as if it had not been taxed at all.'"
169 u.s., at 23.

8.

Citation of Passavant, then, certainly supports the idea
that the Downs Court viewed remission of a tax, in itself,
as a bounty on exports.

In addition, the Court cited the

report of a conference in Brussels on the question of
sugar duties.

That report described as bounties, inter

alia, "'the total or partial exemptions from taxation
granted to a portion of the manufactured products."

u.s.,

187

at 502.
Also, contrary to the suggestion in the SG's

Brief at 33 & n.25, the Treasury's brief in Downs did
appear to argue that the mere remission of a tax would
consititute a bounty:

" • . • [A]ny special favor,

I

benefit, advantage, or inducement conferred by the
government, even if it is not a direct charge upon the
Treasury, is fairly included in the idea and meaning of an
indirect bounty."

Petn lOOa n. 15.

Also, the Qowns Court appeared to make the
determination that the certificates were a bounty on
exports turn on the existence of the remission of the tax:
" . . . [I]f a preference be given to merchandise
exported over that sold in the home market, by
the remission of an excise tax, the effect would
be the same as if all such merchandise were
taxed, and a drawback repaid to the manufacturer
upon so much as he exported. If the additional
bounty [i.e., the certificates] paid by Russia
upon exported sugar were the result of a high
protective tariff upon foreign sugar, and a

9•

further enhancement of prices by a limitation of
the amount of free sugar put upon the market, we
should regard the effect of such regulations as
being simply a bounty upon production, although
it might incidentally and remotely foster an
increased exportation of sugar; but where in
addition to that these regulations exempt sugar
exported from excise taxation altoghether, we
think it clearly falls within the definition of
an indirect bounty upon exportation." 187 U.S.,

at 513.

Thus, the Court's view that the certificate amounted to an
additional bounty on exportation was dependent upon the
prior finding that remission of the tax was also such a
bounty.
As to the fact that the actual countervailing
duty before the Court related only to the value of the
certificates and did not include the amount of the excise
remitted, that was not the Court's fault.

It was the

Treasury that set the amount of the duty, and the amount
was not before the Court.

Only the legal issue as to the

existence of a bounty, not the factual determination as to
its amount, was presented, and the Court resolved that
legal issue in a manner that clearly seems to have
involved a conclusion that remission of an excise tax upon
exportation is a bounty.
This view is supported by G.S. Nicholas & Co. v.
United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).

The controversy in

Nicholas involved a British statute that subjected all
potable spirits distilled and sold in the United Kingdom

10.

to a tax of 14s. 9d. per gallon.

Exporters were not only

exempted from the tax, but were paid an allowance from the
treasury of 3d. per gallon of pure spirits and 5d. per
gallon of compounded spirits.

The Treasury Department

again countervailed only against the extra allowance, not
against the amount of the excise tax remitted.
Nevertheless, the Nicholas Court cited the broad language
of Downs as the holding of that case and added some broad
language of its own:
"[T]he sale of spirits to other countries is
relieved from a burden that their sale in the
United Kingdom must bear. There is a benefit,
therefore, in exportation, an inducement to seek
the foreign market." 249 U.S., at 37.
The only recent case to deal with this issue is
American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191
(Cust. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A.

1~73).

Italy remitted the full amount of various indirect taxes
upon the exportation of electronic transmission tower
components.

Previously, the same taxes had been cast in

the form of a direct tax on the manufacturer's overhead.
Hence, in countervailing against the full amount of the
indirect taxes, the Treasury may have been motivated by
the fact that the taxes strongly resembled the direct tax
they had replaced.

Specifically, there was a lack of

relationship between the value of the goods and the amount

11.

of the taxes remitted that suggested that the taxes were
direct.

The Treasury treated the taxes according to this

underlying nature, rather than their illusory form as
indirect taxes.
GATT;

(Direct taxes are countervailable under

indirect taxes are not.)

The Customs Court upheld

the imposition of the countervailing duty, concluding that
the broad language in

Down~

about remission of indirect

taxes was the holding of the Court.
without reaching the Downs issue.

C.C.P.A. affirmed
Instead, it analyzed

the nature of the taxes at issue and agreed with the
Treasury that they really were direct.

II
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The operative language of the statute has
remained virtually unchanged since 1897.

C.C.P.A.

~-t~~

~··~I

reasoned that since Congress repeatedly has re-enacted the
statute without change, it must approve of the consistent
administrative practice under it.

The court cited two

documents, submitted to Congress, interpreting Downs as
being based on the excessive remission notion (via the
certificates).

Petn 72a-73a.

One was a submission to the

House Ways and Means Committee, the other a report of the
Tariff Commission.

;

12.

The usual presumption that arises from continual
statutory re-enactment in the face of a supposedly
controlling decision of this Court, however, is that the
decision itself controls, not the gloss put upon it by
some bureaucrat, upon which Congress does not even purport
to take any action.

(But cf. United States Steel v.

Multistate Tax Commission,--- U.S.---,--- (White, J.,
dissenting).)

Thus, this line of analysis simply takes us

back to interpretation of what the Downs opinion meant.
Another factor cutting against the narrow
interpretation of C.C.P.A. is that the 1897 Act was a
deliberate expansion of its predecessors.

The Tariff Act

of 1894 provided for payment of an additional duty on
sugar, syrups, and molasses where the exporting country
paid a bounty on exportation.

The 1890 Tariff Act had a

similar provision applying only to sugar.

Apparently,

these sections were intended to apply only to excessive
remissions-- i.e., in excess of the amount of the tax
but in 1897, different language was used, particularly the
addition of the broader word "grant" to supplement
"bounty."

The Nicholas Court adopted this view of the

1897 Act as broadening the statute from excessive
remissions to all remissions.

249 U.S., at 39.

I think

the SG's argument to the contrary is simply misleading.

J

13.

Finally, in 1951 and 1952, the Treasury sought
amendments that would make the statute conform to the
administrative practice of countervailing only against
excessive remissions.

These proposals were rejected.

C.C.P.A. argued that the rejection did not stem from
congressional disapproval of the administrative practice,
but from objections to other parts of the proposals.
78a.

Petn

Furthermore, Congress did not adopt the suggestion

of some witnesses on the Trade Act of 1974 explicitly to
make nonexcess i ve excise remissions countervailable.

The

only inference from all of this is that Congress seems to
c - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -

be satisfied with whatever the Act says.
seems to be what Downs says.

And what it says

~
~

In short, the legislative

history is not very helpful.

~14;>'-

III
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

~

.

~
.

~C..W,4~

Apparently realizing that his position on both
the legislative history and the case law is quite weak,
the SG relies quite heavily on a sort of economic analysis
of the effects of indirect taxes, such as the Japanese
Commodity Tax.

~·
~~~

He attempts to show that failure to

collect such taxes does not amount to a subsidization of
exports, since the product goes off to the foreign land to

14.

compete at its "actual" cost of production, not at a level
below costs of production, as was the case in Downs and
Nicholas.
This argument, however, assumes the conclusion:
that such taxes are not genuine costs of production, the
forgiveness of which amounts to a form of subsidy.

In

other words, the SG takes issue with the language in Downs
and Nicholas to the effect that if exports are excused
from a tax that all products are asked to pay, there is an
inducement to seek the foreign market and consequently, a
subsidy in favor of exports.
The underlying premise of the Treasury's position
-- and GATT'S -- that remissions of direct taxes are
subsidies but remissions of indirect taxes are not, is the
notion that direct taxes are not passed through to the
purchaser but are partially absorbed and partially shifted
backwards to factors of production in the form of lower
wages and lower prices for raw materials;

indirect taxes,

on the other hand are supposed to be passed completely
forward to the purchaser, so that forgiveness of a tax
does not reflect foregiveness of any cost that the
manufacturer would bear in any event.

Hence, there is no

subsidy.
This premise is now widely regarded as untrue by

15.

ecQQomists.

"A review of American economists would

probably now indicate general acceptance of partial
forward shifting of the corporate income tax as well as
some backward shifting of the excise tax.

The extremes of

full shifting in either direction are for the most part
rejected."

114 Cong. Rec. 3660 (1968)

(extension of

remarks of Rep. Curtis, quoting Milton Leontiades).

See

M. Kryzniak & R. Musgrave, The Incidence of the
Corporation Income Tax, chs. 6, 8 (1963).

Even the

Treasury appears to accept this as an economic truth, App.
80, but adheres to its policy on the statute out of fear
of the repercussions that might follow a violation of
GATT.

(Note that the Treasury is not bound to follow

GATT, since a protocol requires the United States to
adhere to the provision about countervailing duties only
to the extent permitted by the law in existence in 1947.
61 Stat. A2051.

Hence, if the statute requires

countervailing duties on remissions of indirect taxes, the
Treasury would be bound by law to countervail, rather than
to follow GATT.)
Where an indirect tax is not fully shifted
forward into the price, a remission of the portion of the
tax not shifted permits the producer to offset some of his
costs.

Hence, there is a subsidy to the extent of the tax

16.

not shifted forward, creating a competitive advantage.
Moreover, it might be possible to look at the
excise tax in the simpler terms of the Downs and Nicholas
Courts.

Any time there is a forgiveness of a burden all

products are asked to bear at horne, there is a subsidy in
the amount of the "societal cost" that manufacturers
generally are asked to pay.

This induces the manufacturer

to seek the foreign market, where he is free of the
responsibility for recognizing the social costs
activities at horne

of his

police and fire protection,

pollution, employment insurance, etc. -- that were covered
by the tax revenues forgiven.

Thus, in a sense it may be

said that he is selling in the foreign market below his
true costs of production.

IV

CONCLUSION
The purpose of Congress does not emerge clearly,
but the application of the normal presumption would tell
us that constant re-enactment in the face of Downs means
that Congress accepted whatever that decision stands for.
As indicated above, it seems to stand for the proposition
that nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, like the
one at issue here, is a countervailable bounty or grant.

17.

Inconsistent administrative practice cannot override that
interpretation, particularly since for the first 76 years
of practice under the Act there was no judicial review of
decisions not to impose a countervailing duty.

See United

States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 404

u.s. 1005 (1971) (finding no

jurisdiction to review negative countervailing duty
determination), overruled by 19 U.S.C.

§

1516(d).

Hence,

there was no effective way to challenge the Treasury
practice.
Modern economic analysis indicates that the Downs
Court was correct in viewing such remissions as
subsidies.

Thus, in the absence of any clear directive

from Congress, the better course would seem to be to
adhere to precedent as supported by economic policy.

If

Congress wishes to define "bounty or grant" more precisely
either to fit GATT or to permit more detailed analysis
by the Secretary of the actual economic effects of
particular taxes, both direct and indirect
do so.

then it may
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WASHINGTON REPORT

Supreme Court Ponders a Time Bomb
By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
WASHINGTON - In Japan they
speak ·of the Zenith case as the "jigan
bakudan" of trade, in Germany as "die
Bombe mit Zeitziindung," in France as
"une bombe a ret:!. dement."
In plain English, these epithets translate as a "trade time bomb," not an exaggerated description of an issue on
which the Supreme Court will announce
a decision at any moment. Trade experts in the United States as well as
abroad compare the potential impact of
a ruling In favor of the Zenith Radio Corporation to what occurred after enactment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of
1930, the protectionist legislation that
many historians believe ushered in the
Great Depression.
The Court will determine whether exporters of goods to the United States are
getting an unfair advantage when they
receive a certain type of tax rebate from
their governments. The arguments:
• Zenith says that the rebate constitutes a "bounty or grant" - a subsidy
that under countervailing-duty legislation should automatically trigger protective levies by the United States to
erase the competitive advantage.
• The Treasury says that the rebate,
under the Government's practice of the
last 80 years, is not an express subsidy
and that if countervailing duties were
applied foreign governments would retaliate against the United States, resulting in massive trade disruption.
"We are watching this case like milk
on a hot· stove," an official of Europe's
Common Market said. "An adverse rulIng could bring <:haos."
Japanese officials see Zenith's position and similar allegations by the
United States Steel Corporation as part
of a protectionist ferment that threatens
economic and political stability in the
world. "It's. a cloud over the multilateral trade negotiations," warns Alonzo
McDonald, this country's deputy trade

In the Zenith case, the Court will decide
whether a tax rebate given to foreign .
companies selling in the U.S. is unfair '·
to U.S. producers. A ruling in favor of
Zenith could turn world trade topsy-turvy.

low. Right after the Customs Court
ruled in favor of Zenith last year, U.S.
Steel echoed Zenith's argument by asking for countervailing duties on steel
from Western Europe. There the value
added tax, an indirect tax borne by consumers throughout the Common Market, Is rebated on exports. If Japanese
electronics companies are getting a
"bounty or grant," U.S. Steel insisted,
so are European steel mills.
The permutations and combinations
are endless and, for American companies, could cut both ways. In March the
Ford Motor Co.m pany filed a friend-ofthe-court brief in the Zenith case, asking
the Supreme Court to narrow the focus
of its ruling. Ford lmports .automobiles
and parts from Its factories abroad and
is afraid that a blanket levying of countervailing duties would raise its costs.
But Ford suggested that it would not
mind higher duties on cars built overseas by foreign-owned companies. ·
Zenith is relying heavily on a Supreme
Court decision of 1903. In that case a
Baltimore importer, Robert E. Downs,
contested the imposition of a countervailing duty on sugar from Russia. The
Czarist Government relieved the exporters of 'the excise tax they would
have owed if the sugar had been sold at
home in Russia .
.
In its decision, the Supreme Court
said: "When a tax is imposed upon all
sugar produced but is remitted upon all
sugar exported, then, by whatever
process or in whatever manner or under
whatever name it is disguised, it Is a
bounty upon exportation." So the sugar
duty remained in force.
This passage sounds as if the Issue had
already been settled. But the Treasury
contends that the passage cannot be
lifted from its context.
The thrust of the ·Treasury's legal argument is that the United States in 1903
was imposing a countervailing duty only
on the amount of excessive tax remission - on what" was identifiable as a

~,

many historians believe ushered in the
Great Depression.
The Court will determine whether exporterS of goods to the United States are
getting an unfair advantage when they
receive a certain type of tax rebate from
their governments. The arguments:
• Zenith says that the rebate constitutes a "bounty or grant" - a subsidy
that under countervailing-duty legislation should automatically trigger protective levies by the United States to
erase the competitive advantage.
• The Treasury says that the rebate,
under the Government's practice of the
last 80 years, is not an express subsidy
and that if countervailing duties were
applied foreign governments would retaliate against the United States, resulting in massive trade disruption.
"We are watching this case like milk
on a h9t stove," an official of Europe's
Common Market said. "An adverse ruling could bring ~haos."
Japanese officials see Zenith's position and similar allegations by the
l,Jnited States Steel Corporation as part
of a protectionist ferment that threatens
economic and political stability in the
world. "It'~ a cloud over the multilateral trade negotiations," warns Alonzo
McDonald~ this country's deputy trade
negotiator.
To soften the blow of a ruling favorable to Zenith's side, the Administration
would have to seek special legislation
from Congress, opening up a Pandora's
box of trade controversy in an election
year - a prospect that American officials view with apprehension.
The precise point at Issue, argued
orally April 25-26 in the ornate Supreme
Court chamber, is whether the rebating
of an indirect "commodity" tax on
Japanese consumer electronic products
exported to the United States is, in a
legal sense, a "bounty or grant." These
words, used in the Tariff Act of 1897,
have never been defined.
When people in Japan buy radio, television or phonograph products, a 15 percent consumption tax (something like a
sales tax in the United States) is paid.
But the 15 percent tax is not imposed on
products made in Japan if they are
shipped I)VerSeaS from the factory. And,
if the tax is paid on a shipment intended
for the domestic market, it is refunded
by the Japanese Government should·the
shipment be exported instead.
Zenith maintains that the refund of
the 15 percent tax is a bounty or grant. If
it is, the Treasury is required by tariff
law to charge a 15 percent countervailing duty on the goods when they enter
the United States.
The company asked the Treasury to

the "ft\is<;hief" of the appellate court's
decisioh. Otherwise, he asserted, theresuit would be "judicial cooperation in
the executive's refusal to honor the exercise by Congres~ of its constitutional
power and duty to regulate foreign com-

on to American consumers, would mean
these price increases: Japanese sporting equipment, 30 percent; Japanese
cameras, 16 percent; French luxury
merchandise, 33.3 percent; French
wines, 17.6 percent; most goods from

tervailing duties would raise
But Ford suggested that it woul
mind higher duties on cars built
seas by foreign-owned companies.
Zenith is relying heavily on a Su1
Court decision of 1903. In that c
B;lltimore importer, Robert E. D
contested the imposition of a co'
vailing duty on sugar from Russh
Czarist Government relieved tb
porters of 'the excise tax they ·
have owed if the sugar had been s
home in Russia.
In its decision, the Supreme
said: "When a tax is imposed up
sugar produced but is.remitted UJl
sugar exported, then, by_ wbi
process or in whatever maMer or
whatever name it is disguised, i
bounty upon exportation." ~ the
duty remained in force.
This passage sounds as if the isst
already been settled. But the Tre
·contends that the passage C8IUI
lifted from its context.
The thrust of the ·Treasury's lef!
gument is that the United States i
was imposing a countervaillngdul
on the amount pf excessive .tax
sion - on what was iden.,
bounty or grant. Over 80 years. t
gument continues, the TreastQt11
swervingly taken the positiOn.
repeatedly by Cqngress, that qpc:
rebates are not bounties or gnlnts ·
they are excessive.
·
· To change the rules now, when
nations have established systellll!
direct taxation (such as the Co
Market's value added tax) an.d ~
port tax rebates have been .
legal under the General Agree
Tariffs and Trade, would
"significant economic disloact~
and abroad," the Treasury decla.
"If there ever were a case,'·' s
Government's brief, "in which thl
should defer to the [Treasury].
. tary's interpretation of the 11ta
administers and leave to COflgr
task of changing the governing
this is that ease."
Meanwhile, · the United ' Stat
shown its concern over export
bates in the. forums.. of ec~nomi~
macy. A sign that the rebates c
come an expiosive issue came
back as 1968 in a Batance of PaJ
address by Presid~t L}rndon Bi
son. "American commerce is at·
vantage," he said, "because of
system of some of our trading ~
Some nations give across-thebates on exports which leave th
. and impose special border t~~~
on.?~~.!~s!~~~~~g.~~~~~~~

soften the blow of a ruling favorable to Zenith's side, the Administration
would have to seek special legislation
from Congress, opening up a Pandora's
box of trade controversy in an election
year - a prospect that American officials view with apprehension.
The precise point at issue, argued
orally April 25-26 in the ornate Supreme
Court chamber, is whether the rebating
of an indirect "commodity" tax on
Japanese consumer electronic products
exported to the United States is, in a
legal sense, a "bounty or grant." These
words, used in the Tariff Act of 1897,
have never been defined.
When people in Japan bu'y radio, television or phonograph products, a 15 percent consumption tax (something like a
sales tax in the United States) is paid.
But the 15 percent tax is not imposed on
products made in Japan if they are
shipped overseas from the factory. And,
if the tax is paid on a shipment intended
for the domestic market, It is refunded
by the Japanese Government shouJd·the
shipment be exported instead.
Zenith maintains that the refund of
the 15 percent tax is a bounty or grant. If
it is, the Treasury is required by tariff
Jaw to charge a 15 percent countervailing duty on the goods when they enter
the United States.
.
The company asked the Treasury to
impose the levy in 1970. The Treasury
refused, contending that Japan's tax
forgiveness on exports is not legally a
bounty or grant. Zenith appealed and
won a unanimous ruling in its favor
from a three-judge United States Customs Court on April12, 1977. The Treasury appealed that ruling to the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and last
July, in a 3-to-2 judgment, it reversed
the lower court.
Though no countervailing duties were
assessed, the Treasury has required
that a 15 percent bond be posted on the
Japanese-made consumer electronic
goods in question. This is to cover the
potential tariff liability on hundreds of
millions of dollars of Japanese ship.
ments if the final ruling vindicates Zenith. The duties would be collected back
to the date of the Customs Court decision.
The next step in the case was Zenith's
appeal to the Supreme Court, and in
February it granted a writ of certiorari,
signaling its willingness to review the
case. All nine Justices were present at
the oral arguments last month.
Zenith's lawyer, Frederick L. Ikenson
of the Washingtn Jaw firm of Stewart &
Ikenson, asked the High Court to correct

the "mischief" of the appellate court's
deciston. Otherwise, he asserted, the result would be "judicial cooperation in
the executive's refusal to honor the exercise by Congres~ of its constitutional
power and duty to regulate foreign commerce."
Solicitor General Wade H. McCree
Jr., arguing for the Treasury, warned of
the risks of a breakdown in international
trade if the lower court's decision were
reversed .
In their questioning, the Justices
showed an awareness of the wider
issues. But there is no way to anticipate
what their decision will be. Statistics
offer little comfort to the Government:
In two-thirds of the cases the Supreme
Court has reviewed, it has reversed rulings of the lower court .
What gives the Zenith case far-reaching significance is the fact that other
large trading partners of the United
States remit similar indirect taxes on
goods they export. The Commerce Department estimates that in 1976 the
value of United States imports on which
indirect taxes were exempted by the
country of origin exceeded $50 billionwhich represents one-half of American
imports.
There would be a significant inflationary, as well as trade, impact if the Supreme Court finds that export tax remission is a bounty or grant. Official figures indicate that imposing countervailing duties on all such imports, if passed

on to American consumers, would mean
these price increases: Japanese sporting equipment, 30 percent; Japanese
cameras, 16 percent; French luxury
merchandise, 33.3 percent; French
wines, 17.6 percent; most goods from
West Germany, 11 percent; most goods
from the Netherlands, 18 percent, and
most goods from Canada, 12 percent.
Solicitor General McCree likened the
impact of added duties such as these to
the impact of Smoot-Hawley in the
1930's, when United States duties on imported goods averaged 17 percent. The
average duty now is 3.9 percent.
If Zenith wins protection against foreign-made prooucts, other American
manufacturers can be expected to fol-

gumem conunues;-tne t reasuryma~
swervingly taken the position, ratified
repeatedly by Congress, that export tax
rebates are not bounties or grants unless
they are excessive.
To change the rules now, when many
nations have established systems of indirect taxation (such as the Common
Market's value added tax) and when export tax rebates have been declared
legal under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, would cause
"significant economic disloactions here
and abroad," the Treasury declares.
"If there ever were a case,'' says the
Government's brief, "in which the Court
should defer to the (Treasury) Secretary's interpretation of the statute he
administers and leave to Congress the
task of changing the governing rules,
this is that case."
Meanwhile, 'the United States has
shown its concern over export tax rebates in the forums of economic diplomacy. A sign that the rebates could become an explosive issue came as far
back as 1968 in a Baiance of Payments
address by President Lyndon B. Johnson. ''American commerce is at a disadvantage,'' he said, "because of the tax
system of some of our trading partners.
Some nations give across-the-board rebates on exports which leave their port
and impose special border tax charges
on our goods entering their country.' •
Robert S. Strauss, this country's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, is pressing for tough standards
governing rebates and subsidies at the
multilateral trade negotiations being
held in Geneva. But the prospects of
winning significant concessions are uncertain.
Clyde H. Farnsworth is a reporter in
the- Washington bureau of The New York
Times.
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I

Under the Commodity Tax Law of Japan, Law No. 48 of 1962,
see App. 44-48, a variety of consumer goods, including the
electronic products at issue here, are subject to an "indirect"
tax -- a tax levied on the goods themselves, and computed as a
percentage of the manufacturer's sales price rather than the
income or wealth of the purchaser or seller.

The Japanese tax

applies both to products manufactured in Japan and to those
imported into Japan.2

On goods manufactured in Japan, the

tax is levied upon shipment from the factory; imported products
are taxed when they are withdrawn from the customs warehouse.
Only goods destined for consumption in Japan are subject to the
tax, however.

Products shipped for export are exempt, and any

tax paid upon the shipment of a product is refunded if the
product is subsequently exported.

Thus the tax is "remitted"

on exports.3
In April 1970 petitioner, an American manufacturer of
consumer electronic products, filed a petition with the

. Commissioner of Customs,4 requesting assessment of
countervailing duties on a number of consumer electronic
products exported from Japan to this country.5

Petitioner

alleged that Japan had bestowed a "bounty or grant" upon
exportation of these products by, inter alia, remitting the
Japanese Commodity Tax that would have been imposed had the
products been sold within Japan.

In January 1976, after

soliciting the views of interested parties and conducting an
investigation pursuant to Treasury Department regulations, see
19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c)

(1977), the Acting Commissioner of

Customs published a notice of final determination, rejecting
petitioner's request.

41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976) .6

Petitioner then filed suit in the Customs Court, claiming
that the Treasury Department had erred in concluding that
remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax was not a bounty or
grant within the purview of the countervailing duty
statute.?

The Department defended on the ground that, since

the remission of indirect taxes was "no~excessive," the statute

4

did not require assessment of a countervailing duty.

In the

Department's terminology, a remission of taxes is
"nonexcessive'' if it does not exceed the amount of tax paid or
otherwise due; thus, for example, if a tax of $5 is levied on
goods at the factory, the return of the $5 upon exportation
would be "nonexcessive," whereas a payment of $8 from the
government to the manufacturer upon exportation would be
"excessive" by $3.

The Department pointed out that the current

version of § 303 is in all relevant respects unchanged from the
countervailing duty statute enacted by Congress in 1897,8 and
that the Secretary -- in decisions dating back to 1898 -- has
always taken the position that the nonexcessive remission of an
indirect tax is not a bounty or grant within the meaning of the
statute.9
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Customs Court
ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the Secretary to
assess countervailing duties on all Japanese consumer
electronic products specified in petitioner's complaint.
F. Supp. 242 (1977).

430

The court acknowledged the Secretary's

longstanding interpretation of the statute.

It concluded,

however, that this administrative practice could not be
sustained in light of this Court's decision in Downs v. United
States, 187

u.s.

496 {1903), which held that an export bounty

had been conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the
regulation of sugar production and sale, involving, among other
elements, remission of excise taxes in the event of exportation.
On appeal by the Government, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, dividing 3-2, reversed the judgment of the
Customs Court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in
favor of the United States.

562 F.2d 1209 (1977).

The

majority opinion distinguished Downs on the ground that it did
not decide the question of whether nonexcessive remission of an
indirect tax, standing alone, constitutes a bounty or grant
upon exportation.

The court then examined the language of §

303 and the legislative history of the 1897 provision and
concluded that, "in determining whether a bounty or grant has
been conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign

6

government's action which controls."

562 F.2d at 1216.

Relying primarily on the "long-continued" and "uniform"
administrative practice, id. at 1218-1219, 1222-1223, and
secondarily on congressional "acquiescence'' in this practice
through repeated re-enactment of the controlling statutory
language, id. at 1220, the court held that interpretation of
"bounty or grant" so as not to include a nonexcessive remission
of an indirect tax is "a lawfully
§

303."

p~rmissible

interpretation of

562 F.2d at 1223.

We granted certiorari,

u.s.

{1978) , and we now

affirm.
II
It is undisputed that the Treasury Department adopted the
statutory interpretation at issue here less than a year after
passage of the basic countervailing duty statute in 1897, see
T.D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of [Treasury] Decisions 696 {1898), ·a nd
that the Department has uniformly maintained this position for
over 80 years.lO
~dministrative

weight.

This longstanding and consistent

interpretation is entitled to considerable

"When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.

'To sustain [an agency's] application of

[a] statutory term, we need not find that its construction
is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result
we would have reached had the question arisen in the first
instance in judicial proceedings.'"

u.s.

Udall v. Tallman, . 380

1, 16 (1965}, quoting Unemployment Compensation

Commission v. Aragon, 329

u.s.

143, 153 (1946}.

Moreover, an administrative "practice has peculiar weight when
it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
[persons] charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and
smoothly while they are yet untried and new."
Nitrogen Products Co . . v. United States, 288
(1933};

see,~,

Norwegian

u.s.

294, 315

Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367

u.s.

396, 408 (1961}.
The question is thus whether, in light of the normal aids
to statutory construction, the Department's interpretation is
"sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court.
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75
(1975}.

Our examination of the language, the legislative

8

history, and the overall purpose of the ' 1897 provision
persuades us that the Department's initial construction of the
statute was far from unreasonable; and we are unable to find
anything in the events subsequent to that time that convinces
us that the Department was required to abandon this
interpretation.
A
The language of the 1897 statute evolved out of two earlier
countervailing duty provisions that had been applicable only to·
sugar imports.

The first provision was enacted in 1890,

apparently for the purpose of protecting domestic · sugar
refiners from unfair foreign competition; it provided for a
fixed countervailing duty on refined sugar imported from
countries that "pay • . . , directly or indirectly, a [greater]
bounty on the exportation of" refined sugar than on raw sugar.
Tariff Act of 1890, ' 237, 26 Stat. 584.

Although the

congressional debates did not focus sharply on the meaning of
the word "bounty," what evidence there is suggests that the

term was not intended to encompass the nonexcessive remission
of an indirect tax.

Thus, one strong supporter of increased

protection for American sugar producers heavily criticized the
export "bounties" conferred by several European governments,
and attached a concise description of "The Bounty Systems in
Europe"; both the remarks and the description indicated that
the "bounties" consisted of the amounts by which government
payments exceeded the excise taxes that had been paid upon the
beets from which the sugar was produced.
9529, 9532 (1890)
(description).

See 21 Cong. Rec.

(remarks of Sen. Gibson); id. at 9537

According to the description, for example,

French sugar manufacturers paid an "excise tax [of] $97.06 per
gross ton [,]

[b]ut upon the export of a ton of sugar

received back as a drawback $117.60, making a clear bounty of
$20~54

per gross ton of sugar exported."

This concept of a "net" bounty

Id. at 9537.

that is, a remission in

excess of taxes paid or otherwise due --

as the trigger for a

countervailing duty requirement emerged more clearly in the
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second sugar provision, enacted in 1894;
182 1/2, 28 Stat. 521.

Tariff Act of 1894, t

The 1894 statute extended the

countervailing duty requirement to all imported sugar, raw as
well as refined, and provided for payment of a fixed duty on
all sugar coming from a country which "pays, directly or
indirectly, a bounty on the export thereof."

A proviso to the

statute made clear, however, that no duties were to be assessed
in the event that the "bounty" did not exceed the amount of
taxes already paid.ll

The author of the 1894 provision,

Senator Jones, expressly characterized this difference between
the amounts received upon exportation and the amounts already
paid in taxes as the "net bounty" on exportation.
Rec. 5705 (1894)

26 Cong.

(discussing German export bounty system).

The 1897 statute greatly expanded upon the coverage of the
1894 provision by making the countervailing duty requirement
applicable to all imported products.

Tariff Act of 1897, § 5,

30 Stat. 205, quoted in n. 8, supra.

There are strong

indications, however, that Congress intended to retain the "net
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bounty" concept of the 1894 provision as the criterion for
determining when a countervailing duty was to be imposed.
Although the proviso in the 1894 law was deleted, the 1897
statute did provide for levying of duties equal to the "net
amount" of any export bounty or grant.

And the legislative

history suggests that this language, in addition to
establishing a responsive mechanism for determining the
appropriate amount of countervailing duty, was intended to
incorporate the prior rule that nonexcessive remission of
indirect taxes would not trigger the countervailing requirement
at all.
There is no question that the prior rule was carried
forward in the version of the 1897 statute that originally
passed the House.

This version did not extend the

countervailing duty requirement to all imports.

Instead, it

merely modified the 1894 sugar provision so that the amount of
the countervailing duty, rather than being fixed, would be
"equal to [the export] bounty, or so much thereof as may be in

excess of any tax collected by [the foreign] country upon [the]
exported [sugar], or upon the beet or cane from which it was
See 30 Cong. Rec. 1634 (1897).

"

produced

The House

Report unequivocally stated that the countervailing duty was
intended to be "equivalent to the net export bounty paid by any
country."
(emphasis

H.R. Rep. No. 1, 55th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1897)
supplied)~

The Senate deleted the House provision from the bill and
replaced it with the more general provision that was eventually
enacted into law.

See 30 Cong. Rec. at 1733 (striking House

provision); id. at 2226 (adopting general provision); id. at
2705, 2750 (House agreement to Senate amendment).

The debates

in the Senate indicate, however, that -- aside from extending
the coverage of the House provision -- the Senate did not
intend to change its substance.

Senator Allison, the sponsor

of the Senate amendment, explained that the House provision was
being "stricken from the bill," because "the same paragraph in
substance [is] being inserted [in] section [5], making this
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countervailing duty apply to all articles instead of to [sugar]
alone."

Id. at 1635.

See also id. at 1732 (remarks of Sen.

White) •

Senator Allison twice remarked that the countervailing

duty that he was proposing was an "imitation" of the one
provided in the 1894 statute, id. at 1719; see id. at 1674, and
later in the debates he stated -- in response to a question as
to whether the countervailing duty would be equal to "the whole
amount of the export bounty"

that "[the bounty contemplated]

is the net bounty, less the taxes and reductions . . . ," id.
at 1721 (answering question by Sen. Vest).

: .

An additional indication of the Senate's intent can be
found in the extended discussion of the effect that the statute
would have with respect to German sugar exports.

Time after

time the amount of the German "bounty" -- and, correspondingly,
the amount of the countervailing duty that would be imposed
under the statute -- was stated to be 38¢ per 100 pounds of
refined sugar, and 27¢ per 100 pounds of raw sugar.

See, e.g.,

id. at 1650 (remarks of Sens. Allison, Vest, and Caffery), 1658

.

-·-- ..... .

.. .

r-

(Sens. Allison and Jones), 1680 (Sen. Jones), 1719 (Sens.
Allison and Lindsay), 1729 (Sen. Caffery), 2823-2824 (Sens.
Aldrich and Jones).

These figures were supplied by the

Treasury Department itself, see id. at 1719 (remarks of Sen.
Allison), 1722 (letter from Treasury Department to Sen.
Caffery) , and were utilized by both proponents and opponents of
the measure.

And yet it was frequently acknowledged during the

debates that Germany exempted sugar exports from its domestic
consumption tax of $2.16 per 100 pounds, an amount far in
excess of the 38¢ and 27¢ figures.

See,

~'

id. at 1646

(remarks of Sen. Vest), 1651 (Sen. Caffery), 1697 (same), 2205
(same).

Had the Senators considered the mere remission of an

indirect tax to be a "bounty," it seems unlikely that they
would have stated that the German "bounties" were only 38¢ and
27¢ per 100 pounds.l2

Especially in light of the strong

opposition to countervailing duties even of the magnitude of
38¢ and 27¢,

see,~'

id. at 1719 (remarks of Sen. Lindsay),

2203-2205 (remarks of Sen. Gray), it seems reasonable to infer

that Congress did not intend to impose countervailing duties of
many times this magnitude.
B

Regardless of whether this legislative history absolutely
compelled the Secretary to interpret "bounty or grant" so as
not to encompass any nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax,
there can be no doubt that such a construction was reasonable
in light of the statutory purpose.
Publications Service, Inc., 411

u.s.

Cf. Mourning v. Family
356, 374 (1973).

This

purpose is relatively clear from the face of the statute and is
confirmed by the congressional debates:

the countervailing

duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage
that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export
subsidies paid by their governments.

See,

~,

30 Cong. Rec.

at 1674 {remarks of Sen. Allison), 2205 (Sen. Caffery), 2225
(Sen. Lindsay).

The Treasury Department was well-positioned to

establish rules of decision that would accurately carry out
this purpose, particularly since it had contributed the very

16
figures relied upon by Congress in enacting the statute.
Zuber v. Allen, 396

u.s.

See

168, 192 (1969}.

In deciding in 1898 that a nonexcessive remission of
indirect taxes did not result in the type of competitive
advantage that Congress intended to counteract, the Department
was clearly acting in accordance with the shared assumptions of
the day as to the fairness and economic effect of that
practice.

The theory underlying the Department's position was

that a foreign country's remission of indirect taxes did not
constitute subsidization of that country's exports.

Rather,

such remission was viewed as a reasonable measure for avoiding
double taxation of exports -- once by the foreign country and
once upon sale in this country.

As explained in a recent study

prepared by the Department for the Senate Committee on Finance,
"[the Department's construction was] based on the principle
that, since exports are not consumed in the country of
production, they should not be subject to consumption taxes
in that country.

The theory has been that the application

of countervailing duties to the rebate of consumption [and
other indirect] taxes would have the effect of double
taxation of the product, since the United States would not
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only impose its own indirect taxes, such as Federal ana
state excise taxes ana state ana local sales taxes, but
would also collect, through the use of the countervailing
duty, the indirect tax imposed by the exporting country on
domestically consumed goods."

Executive Branch GATT

Studies, Senate Comm. on Finance, 93o Cong., 2a Sess. 17-18
(1974).
This intuitively appealing principle regarding double taxation
had been widely accepted both in this country ana abroad for
many years prior to enactment of the 1897 statute.

See,

~,

Act of July 4, 1789, § 3, 1 Stat. 26 (remission of import
duties upon exportation of products); 4 D. Ricardo, _works ana
Correspondence 216-217 (P. Sraffa eo. 1951)

(first published in

1822); A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, Book Four, ch. IV (1776).

c
The Secretary's interpretation of the countervailing duty
statute is as permissible today as it was in 1898.

The statute

has been re-enacted five times by Congress without any
modification of the relevant language, see n. 8 supra, ana,
whether or not Congress can be said to have "acquiesced" in the
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administrative practice, it certainly has not acted to change
it.

At the same time, the Secretary's position has been

incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),l3 which is followed by every major trading nation in
the world; foreign tax systems as well as private expectations
thus have been built on the assumption that countervailing
duties would not be imposed on nonexcessive remissions of
indirect taxes.

In light of these substantial reliance

interests, the longstanding administrative construction of the
statute should ''not be disturbed except for cogent reasons."
McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921); see Udall v.
Tallman, supra, 380

u.s.

at 18.

Aside from the contention, discussed in Part III, infra,
that the Department's construction is inconsistent with this
Court's decisions, petitioner's sole argument is that the
Department's position is premised on false economic assumptions
that should be rejected by the courts.

In particular,

petitioner points to "modern" economic theory suggesting that

remission of indirect taxes may create an incentive to export
in some circumstances, and to recent criticism of the GATT
rules as favoring producers in countries that rely more heavily
on indirect than on direct taxes.l4

But, even assuming that

these arguments are at all relevant in view of the legislative
history of the 1897 provision and the longstanding
administrative construction of the statute, they do not
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the Secretary's current
positio~.

Even "modern" economists do not agree on the

ultimate economic effect of remitting indirect taxes, and -given the present state of economic knowledge --

it may be

difficult, if not impossible, to measure the precise effect in
any particular case.

See,

~,

Executive Branch GATT Studies,

supra, at 13-14, 17; Marks & Malmgren, supra n. 14, at 351.
More fundamentally, as the Senate Committee with responsibility
in this area recently stated, "the issues involved in applying
the countervailing duty law are complex, and . • .
internationally, there is [a] lack of any satisfactory
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agreement on what constitutes a fair, as opposed to an
'unfair,' subsidy."

S. Rep. No. 93-1298, p. 183 (1974).

In

this situation, it is not the task of the judiciary to
substitute its views as to fairness and economic effect for
those of the Secretary.

III

Notwithstanding all of the foregoing considerations, this
would be a very different case if, as petitioner contends, the
Secretary's practice were contrary to this Court's decision in
Downs v. United States, supra, 187

u.s.

496.15

Upon close

examination of the admittedly opaque opinion in that case,
however, we do not believe that Downs is controlling on the
issue presented here.
The Russian sugar laws at issue in Downs were, as the Court
noted, "very complicated."

Id. at 502.

Much of the Court's
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opinion was devoted to an exposition of these provisions, see
id. at 502-512, but for present purposes only two features are
relevant:

(1) excise taxes imposed on sugar sales within

Russia were remitted on exports; and {2) the exporter received,
in addition, a certificate entitling its bearer to sell an
amount of sugar in Russia, equal to the quantity exported,
without paying the full excise tax otherwise due.

This

certificate was transferable and had a substantial market value
related to the amount of tax forgiveness that it carried with
it.
The Secretary, following the same interpretation of the
statute that he followed here, imposed a countervailing duty
based on the value of the certificates alone, and not on the
excise taxes remitted on the export~ themselves.l6

Downs,

the importer, sought review claiming that the Russian system
did not confer any countervailable bounty or grant within the
meaning of the 1897 statute.

He did not otherwise challenge

the amount of the duty assessed by the Secretary.l7

22

The issue as it came before this Court, therefore, was
whether a nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, together
with the granting of an additional benefit represented by the
value of the certificate, constituted a "bounty or grant."
Since the amount of the bounty was not in question, neither the
parties nor this Court focused carefully on the distinction
between remission of the excise tax and conferral of the
certificate.

Petitioner argues, however, that certain broad

language in the Court's opinion suggests that mere remission of
a tax, even if nonexcessive, must be considered a bounty or
grant within the meaning of the statute.

Petitioner relies in

particular on the following language:
"The details of this elaborate procedure for the
production, sale, taxation and exportation of Russian sugar
are of much less importance than the two facts which appear
clearly through this maze of regulations, viz.:

that no

sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that does not pay
an excise tax of R. 1.75 per pood, and that sugar exported
pays no tax at all . . . • When a tax is imposed upon all
sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported,
then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under
whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon
exportation." Id. at 515.

This passage is inconsistent with both preceding and
subsequent language which suggests that the Court understood
the "bounty" to reside in the value of the certificates.

At

one point the Court stated that "[t]he amount [the exporter]
receives for his export certificate [on the market], say, R.
1.25, is the exact amount of the bounty he receives upon
exportation . • .

"

187

u.s.

at 515.18

And the Court in

conclusion specifically endorsed the Fourth Circuit's holding
to the same effect, see n. 17 supra:
"[T]he Circuit Court of Appeals found:

'That the Russian

exporter of sugar obtained from his government a
certificate, solely because of such exportation, which is
worth in the open market of that country from R. 1.25 to R.
1.64 per pood, or from 1.8 to 2.35 cents per pound.
Therefore we hold that the government of Russia does secure
to the exporter of that country, as the inevitable result
of its action, a money reward or gratuity whenever he
exports sugar from Russia.'
expression of opinion."

We all concur in this

187 U.S. at 516.

Given this other language, we cannot read for its broadest
implications the passage on which petitioner relies.

In our

view the passage does no more than establish the proposition
that an excessive remission of taxes -- there, the combination

of the exemption with the certificates

is an export bounty

within the meaning of the statute.
As the court below noted, "' [i]t is a maxim, not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to
be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions
are used.'"

562 F.2d at 1213, quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6

Wheat. 264, 398 {1821).

No one argued in Downs that a

nonexcessive remission of taxes, standing alone, would have
constituted a bounty on exportation, and indeed that issue was
not presented on the facts of the case.

It must also be

remembered, of course, that the Court did affirm the
Secretary's decision, and that decision rested on the
conclusion that a bounty had been paid only to the extent that
I

the remission exceeded the taxes otherwise due.

In light of

all these circumstances, the isolated statement in Downs relied
upon by petitioner cannot be dispositive here.
The judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is,
accordingly,
Affirmed.
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Bob
Mr. Justice Marshall's Draft in Zenith Radio v. U.S.

I think that this is a first-rate opinion right up
until 20, where the discussion of the Downs case begins.
At that point, a fupge begins, since a close of analysis
of Downs would seem to indicate that the holding of the
case precludes the result Justice Marshall has to reach.
Still, Downs is extremely opaque, and this reading is not
completely unfair.
If you are willing to swallow this rather facile
treatment of a less-than-crystal-clear precedent, you
could join.

Otherwise, you could dissent along the

following lines:

Although the Court's discussion of the
legislative history of the Tariff Act and the administrative
practice thereunder is most persuasive, I am constrained
to dissent. In my view, a close reading of Downs v.
United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903), precludes us from
reaching the result reached by the Court today, the
long administrative practice notwithstanding.

.·
.,

'.~-

No. 77-539 Zenith Radio v.

.•,

,.
':'t'

...

Dear Thurgood:
Although I continue to have difficulty
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Please join me. I, like Lewis, continue to have some
difficulty with Downs. I also was somewhat disturbed by the
long administrative delay here and by the Japanese communication distributed shortly before the oral argument.
Your addition to footnote 9 is most helpful.
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